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Let us begin by noting that Australia's postcolonial condition is for the most part 
a consequence of claims made upon it - land claims, compensation claims, and 
so on - by its Aboriginal people. It would be possible to describe Aboriginal 
people at this point in Australia's modern history as charismatic, in their capacity 
to mobilise forces much larger than their "minority" status would suggest. When 
a claim is made on a sacred site, this feature is especially apparent: a government 
can look forward to losing millions of dollars through legal procedures that 
invariably bring together a "smorgasbord" (as one newspaper described it) of 
interest groups over a protracted period of time. In this climate, Aborigines 
certainly continue to receive sympathy for what they do not have - good health, 
adequate housing, and so on and yet at the same time they draw resentment 
from white Australians because they seem to be claiming more than their "fair 
share". We have elsewhere described this double-headed view of Aborigines as 
lacking on the one hand, and yet appearing on the other hand to have too much: 
too much land, too much national attention, too much "effect" (see Gelder and 
Jacobs, 1 995b).  It is surely a strange irony to hear white Australians these 
days - including some maverick Federal politicians - describing Aborigines as 
more franchised, more favoured, than they are. The benign side of this kind of 
racism works itself out in various polemics by white Australians which turn to 
Aboriginal spirituality as a way of healing a non-Aboriginal malaise (for example, 
Tacey 1 995) .  Again, Aborigines are seen to have what ·we" do not have: 
spirituality, sociality, charisma, cohesion: something extra. 
We can nominate two important precursors which speak to this strange 
modern predicament. The sociologist Emile Durkheim, in The Elementary Forms of 
the Religious Life ( 1 9 1 5), drew an intimate connection between spirituality -
religion - and sociality, using available material on Australian Aborigines to 
illustrate the point. For Durkheim, "primitive" religion provides the paradigm for 
modern society in the sense that it establishes a notion of the social - so that, 
from a certain point of view, the "primitive" and the modern ("the man of to-day") 
are more alike than one might at first imagine. Durkheim describes modernity in 
terms of "the development of luxury", as if it stands in a kind of superstructural 
relationship to the more "elementary" features of the "primitive" (Durkheim 
1 976:6). Yet even this distinction is compromised, as when he notes that 
"primitive" religion can itself be a "luxurious" thing: "it is not equivalent to saying 
that all luxury is lacking to the primitive" (ibid . :  6n). So modernity is seen to have 
something extra, something more than the "primitive" - which is lacking. And yet 
there is this concession which suggests that the "primitive" does not lack, that it, 
too, has that something extra which otherwise defines modernity. The paradox of 
this position is nicely expressed in Durkheim's subsequent description of "the lower 
religious" as "rudimentary and gross" (ibid . :  8).  At first glance, such a description 
would seem simply to stabilise the "primitive" status of Aboriginal religion. But in 
fact, these two words flatly contradict each other. "Rudimentary" means 
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•underdeveloped" or "elemental", and maintains this sense that "primitive" religion 
is not modern. But "gross" means "luxuriant" or "flagrant" or "excessive": it has 
quite the opposite effect. In other words, this description suggests lack and 
plenitude at the same time, both distinguishing the "primitive" from the modern 
and yet allowing it to overflow into modernity on the grounds that it, too, can be 
a "luxurious" thing. We can write the following equation for this strange paradox: 
the •primitive" is {not) modern. And this is not dissimilar to the contradiction that 
underwrites postcolonial racism: that one { i .e.  a minority culture, Aborigines) can 
lack and have that "something extra" at the same time. 
Our second precursor for thinking through this strange paradox is Sigmund 
Freud's influential essay, ""The 'Uncanny'" { 1 9 1 9) ,  published just four years after 
Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Freud's concern is also 
with the (dis)entanglement of the "primitive" and the modern, the past and the 
present. It is addressed primarily to the psyche, but it also speaks directly to the 
question of one's place in the world, attending to anxieties which were 
symptomatic of an on-going process of realignment in post-War Europe. It is well 
known that Freud elaborates the "uncanny" by way of two German words whose 
meanings, which at first seem diametrically opposed, in fact circulate through each 
other. These two words are: heimlich, which Freud glosses as "home", a familiar 
or accessible place; and unheimlich, which is unfamiliar, strange, inaccessible, 
unhomely {Freud 1 987:342-7). An "uncanny" experience may occur when one's 
home - one's place - is rendered somehow and in some sense unfamiliar; one 
has the experience, in other words, of being in place and "out of place" 
simultaneously. This happens precisely at the moment when one is made aware 
that one has unfinished business with the past, at the moment when the past 
returns as an "elemental" force {and let us signal our interest in ghosts here 
through this word: "elemental") to haunt the present day. Freud's "uncanny" can 
be applied directly to conditions in postcolonial Australia, in particular after the 
Mabo decision in 1 992 and the subsequent anxieties about who might come to 
own what. An Aboriginal claim to land is quite literally a claim concerning 
unfinished business, a claim which enables what should have been laid to rest to 
overflow into the otherwise 'homely" realm of modernity. In this moment of 
decolonisation, what is "ours" is also potentially, or  even always already, 
"theirs" - an aspect of the ongoing recovery of Aboriginal identity in the modern 
scene of postcolonial Australia. The past returns to the present as the think which 
was lacking but which - when it does return - then functions as that •something 
extra". An Aboriginal claim tor land or for a sacred site {especially when it 
happens to be rich in mineral deposits) is often represented quite literally in this 
way, as something the nation cannot afford : a "luxury". 
We have elsewhere {Gelder and Jacobs 1 995a) used an evocative word to 
describe this return and the effects it generates, a word lifted from a footnote in 
Jacques Derrida's seminal essay "Diff_rance" { 1 970): solicit. Here, Derrida alerts 
us to some of the meanings embedded in the kind of structure which involves one 
thing {e.g. the past) soliciting another thing {e.g. the present) - when solicit is 
taken as an activating verb {Derrida 1 982: 1 6) .  But let us give a fuller picture of 
this word's activating possibilities here. It can mean, firstly, "to incite", "to allure", 
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"to attract" - definitions which rightly draw attention to the seductive features 
of Aboriginal spirituality, sociality, etc. for many modern non-Aboriginal 
Australians. But there are other, less benign meanings embedded in this word: "to 
disturb", "to make anxious", "to fill with concern". We can also cite a more 
dramatic definition of solicit given by Derrida's translator: "to shake the whole, to 
make something tremble in its entirety" (ibid . :  1 6n) .  Let us note that an Aboriginal 
claim for a sacred site, for example, can indeed work to "shake" the entire country, 
to unsettle the regulative, homely economies of a "settler" nation. One could 
equally as well read this force in a positive way, of course, as a way of inducing 
the kind of realignment of power that accompanies decolonisation. In this context, 
we should remember the more obvious meaning of the word solicit: "to conduct 
(a lawsuit)", .uto press or represent a matter", 11tO transact or negotiate". This is 
a real feature of Aboriginal claims to land and sacred sites in Australia, which we 
always conducted through the law courts and which precisely involve transactions 
and negotiations - between the one and the other, the past and the present, 
Aborigines and modernity. 
Let us just indicate some of the uses to which the "uncanny" can be put in 
the context of postcolonial Australia. We often speak of Australia as a "settler" 
nation - but the ·uncanny" can remind us that a condition of unsettled-ness folds 
into this often taken-for-granted mode of occupation. We often imagine a (future) 
condition of "reconciliation", and indeed, a great deal is invested in the packaging 
of this image as a means of selling it to the nation - but the "uncanny" can remind 
us of just how unreconcilable this image is with itself. It is not simply that 
Aboriginal and white Australians will either be reconciled with each other or they 
will not; rather, these two possibilities (reconciliation; the impossibility of 
reconciliation) co-exist and flow through each other in what is often a productively 
unstable dynamic. Another, not unrelated, binary structure at work in 
contemporary Australia can also be mentioned here. In relation to Aborigines, 
modern white Australians can either be innocent, in the sense of not actually 
having participated in the earlier horrors of colonisation, in the traumas of the past; 
or they can be guilty, in the sense that even to be postcolonial is not to be free 
from these past horrors, which ceaselessly return to haunt us. How implicated Mft 
postcolonials in the past? Paradoxically enough, the appeal to innocence casts 
white Australians as "out of place", uninvolved in those formative colonial 
processes; while one's participation in what is sometimes cynically called "the guilt 
industry" would render white Australians as in fact too involved, too embedded irl 
place in the sense that every one of the, even the most recent immigrant, 
automatically inherits the (mis)fortunes of Australia's colonial history. In 
postcolonial Australia, however, it may well be that both of these positions are 
inhabited at the same time: one can be both innocent ("out of place") and guilty 
("in place") .  And this is entirely consistent with postcoloniality as a contemporary 
condition, whereby one remains within the structures of colonialism (with all its 
attendant horrors) even as one is temporally located beyond them or "after" them. 
An Aboriginal claim for a sacred site it, as we have suggested, a salutary reminder 
that the past is always a matter of unfinished business. We may "innocently" 
imagine that there is no place for Aboriginal sacredness in a modern secular nation. 
But in fact it seems - to some commentators, at least - as if sacredness is 
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potentially all over the place, as if the nation has (reluctantly? willingly?) given 
itself over to the unleashed requirements of a previously diminished minority 
culture - as if it is ceaselessly being solicited, seduced, shaken up, taken to court. 
The features we are describing here are, of course, by no means peculiar to 
contemporary Australia. Speaking broadly, this sense of modernity as a form of 
•unsettled settled ness" - as an "uncanny" thing - is experienced only too often 
elsewhere in the world. When a nation (especially when it is imagined as •one 
nation", to use a phrase commonly invoked both in Australia and in Britain) 
engages with others - indigenous people, immigrants, separatists - a sense of 
national identity is both enabled and disabled. The presence of "foreigners at 
home" can intensify a nation's investment in the idea of a national "self" at the 
very moment at which such an idea is traumatically unsettled. Julia Kristeva's 
book, Strangers to Ourselves ( 1 991 ), is a mediation on this problematic which 
draws, inevitably perhaps, upon Freud's seminal essay. A nation·s engagement 
with "foreigners" leads her to offer a definitive structure for modernity built around 
the tension between union and separation - what in Australia would be 
"reconciliation", and the impossibility of reconciliation (Kristeva 1 99 1 :  1 7 1 -3) .  The 
problem here involves the fact that boundaries which might have distinguished the 
one from the other are no longer tenable or even recognisable. For Kristeva, a 
certain anxiety results which stems from the difficulty of disentangling what is 
one's "home" from what is not one's "home" - what is "foreign" or strange. As 
Kristeva notes, Freud's uncanny speaks to this anxiety directly: 
Freud wanted to demonstrate at the outset, on the basis of a semantic 
study of the German adjective heimlich and its antonym unheimlich, that a 
negative meaning close to that of the antonym is already tied to the positive 
term heimlich, "friendlily (sic) comfortable", which would also signify 
"concealed, kept from sight", "deceitful and malicious", "behind someone's 
backH. Thus, in the very word heimlich, the familiar and intimate are 
reversed into their opposites, brought together with the contrary meaning 
of "uncanny strangeness• harboured in unheimlich (ibid.: 1 82). 
In fact, "unheimlich" is further glossed by Freud as meaning "withdrawn 
from knowledge", obscure and inaccessible - as well as untrustworthy (Freud 
1987: 346). It is worth noting that these have been available characterisations of 
Aboriginal relations to the sacred, where secrecy is often associated (by mining 
companies, by government officials, etc. )  with deception. But even a racist charge 
of deception is open to the uncanny effect since it is spoken in structure which can 
never be subjected to any definitive kind of verification. If Aborigines say that a 
sacred site is here, and a non-Aboriginal ·expert" says that this sacred site is 
somewhere else - which is the way some claims about sacredness fall out -
what you actually get is two sacred sites for the price of one! The latter claim, in 
other words, by no means disproves the former - nor can it ever hope to do so 
in any "settled" way. In this context it is worth recalling that Freud himself had 
noted, "heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of 
ambivalence" (ibid. :347). Kristeva's strategy is to internalise and individuate this 
ambivalence, as a means of coping with it. We should, she suggests, come to 
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terms with the "stranger in ourselves": "The foreigner is within us. And when we 
flee from our struggle against the foreigner, we are fighting our unconscious -
that 'improper· facet of our impossible 'own and proper'" (Kristeva 1 991 : 1 9 1  ) .  
So Kristeva draws a connection between a "foreigner" and the "improper" 
unconscious which solicits one's sense of a "proper" self, i .e . ,  one's sense of 
property. It would be worth noting, however, that her advocation of a psychic 
coming-to-terms with the "foreigner" within us all is in itself a •reconciliatory" 
gesture which would remove the kinds of ambivalence that inhere in the uncanny. 
But there is no need to wish "improper" anxieties away - at least in the 
postcolonial context, where they may well have productive effects. 
Australia may itself have been a "foreigner at home". At least, this is the 
account given by Ross Gibson in his book, South of the West: Postcolonialism and 
the Narrative Construction of Australia ( 1 992). For Gibson, Australia has been •a 
duplicitous object" for the western world in the sense that it is "demonstrably a 
'European' Society" ( i .e.  familiar) and yet also "fantastic and other-worldly" (i.e. 
unfamiliar): 
Westeners can recognise themselves there at the same time as they 
encounter an alluringly exotic and perverse entity, the phantasm called 
Australia. Westeners can look South and feel "at home", but, because the 
region has also served as a projective screen for European aspiration and 
anxiety, Australia also calls into question the assumptions and satisfaction's 
by which any society or individual feels at home (Gibson 1 992: x). 
The sense of this last sentence may not be entirely clear, but overall Gibson 
seems to be saying that - from the externalised position of the westener - one 
can imagine being "in place" in Australia only through the realisation that one is 
also "out of place". Gibson in fact invokes the uncanny in his description (although 
it is an unacknowledged invocation):  Australia is "both strange and familiar, in 
other words, an enigma" (ibid . :  xi i ) .  The problem with this book, however, is that 
although it is prepared to indulge this image of Australia as an "enigma" to the rest 
of the world (a view which, in our opinion, would need some qualifications since 
it sounds like a variant on the Australian "cultural cringe"), when it looks at 
Australia from within it produces an image of the country which is, in the first 
instance at least, far from uncanny. 
Gibson is aware of the mythical teleogy of "settler" Australia, which 
fantasises about "reconciliation" or (using Kristeva·s word) "union" - where a 
colony "would gradually 'belong', it would eventually be ' in place', and it would 
cease to be a colony" (ibid . :  72). However, he yearns for this teleogy himself from 
time to time, especially - as it happens - when he is drawn to consider 
Australian landscape poetry: 
It is the development of this sense of subjective immersion in place, this ability 
to place and to think oneself in systems of settlement other than the 
acquisitive process of a conquistadorial survey, that might be a reason for 
optimism as the third colonial century commences in the South Land (ibid: 
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Oddly - through the •subjective" space of landscape poetry - Gibson 
creates the possibility of being "at home" in Australia, a possibility he had 
disavowed elsewhere. Even more oddly still, he maps out a route through which 
settlers can actually become, at some kind of final moment, indigenous. He can 
do this because in spite of his book"s subtitle, he does not address the concept of 
postcolonialism at all (on this point, see McKee 1 994: 3 1 1 -5 1 .  Indeed, Aborigines 
themselves (the actual indigenes) barely feature in his discussion. Gibson's homely 
space, however, is not entirely bereft of otherness, as this long passage on a 
notorious outback Australian techno-military installation suggests: 
But this is not to say that everyone has redefined their understanding of their 
place in the landscape. The more militarist attitude, which sees the continent 
as a foe to be brought to rule, still ranges abroad. The submerged domes of 
Pine Gap are obvious talismans: white Australians' (mythically induced) sense 
of the untouchability of the geographical centre has been turned to military 
advantage: what better place to locate unknowable technology than the arcane 
heartland where Nature preserve the most occult of mysteries 7 It is a canny 
[i.e. not uncanny!] ploy. Whereas white Australia has traditionally looked for 
security from the landscape, a black magic promises to turn the world upside 
down by maintaining that there is security in the landscape ... When the land 
becomes so otherworldly that only a .. masonic" class of technocrats can 
administer it, the conquistadorial class has taken its project to its end point . . .  
(Gibson 1 992: 9 1 -21. 
What Gibson produces here, strangely enough, is an image of a sacred site. 
We are directed to "the submerged domes of Pine Gap" at the •geographical 
centre" of Australia - rather than, say, to Uluru (Ayers Rock). This installation is 
made •otherworldly"; it is secretive and "masonic", returning us to Kristeva's gloss 
on unheimlich. It uses (in a strange invocation of the •primitive") •black magic"; 
it is unsettling to Gibson's yearning for homeliness-in-the-nation. There is an irony 
in noting that this particular sacred site - for all its •primitive" features - is 
indeed a modern one! And in fact it is modernity itself which produces the 
uncanny effect for Gibson's ideal of settlement, a modernity which. is 
uncomfortably underwritten by globalised, "militarist" capital. Indeed, what we 
have with Gibson's image of Pine Gap is a text-book case of the uncanny effect 
whereby, through an act of repression, Pine Gap appears unfamiliar to Gibson 
precisely because it provides him with in image of modernity which is all too 
familiar. So Pine Gap is to Gibson what (in his account) Australia is to the rest of 
the world: ·soth strange and familiar, in other words, an enigma". Of course, if, 
under modernity, Australia were able to be settled through any form other than 
capitalism, then it might truly 2g an enigma! By imagining an Australia divorced 
from globalised capital, Gibson gives us a nostalgic structure where one can be 
·subjectively immersed" in the former in order to remain alienated from the latter. 
In this arrangement, it is not that Australia is an •enigma" to the west, but the 
other way around. 
When she thinks about one's relations to the "foreign", Julia Kristeva wonders 
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what kind of response might be forthcoming: "To worry or to smile, such is the 
choice when we are assailed by the strange; our decision depends on how familiar 
we are with our own ghosts" (Kristeva 1 991 : 1 91 ). We might well ask, how 
familiar is Australia with its own ghosts? Who "smiles" at them and who 
·worries" about them? Let us turn, as a way of thinking through this issue, to a 
genre of writing which tunes into the landscape in a very different way to the kind 
of poetry which Ross Gibson had privileged: the Australian ghost story. 
Certainly the ghost story in Australia is a minor genre, a marginal genre. To 
recall Durkheim's telling phrase, the ghost story is "rudimentary" (an "elementary" 
form, something less than literature, even something "primitive") - and yet there 
is also something "gross" or luxurious about it, too. These contradictory 
characteristics are built into the sensationalism of this genre. Many Australian 
ghost stories are •over-the-top", hysterical, histrionic, spectacular, overflowing, 
meandering, •creaky", indulgent: all this unfolds through the constraints of a minor 
genre. Australian ghost stories are also generally site-based - and there is often 
an implied connection between a haunted site and a sacred site, as in William 
Sylvester Walker's evocative story, "The Evil of Yelcomorn Creek" ( 1 899; see 
Gelder 1 994). But these stories do not respect the localness of their sites; they 
are never constrained in this sense. Instead, they show how their sites work to 
influence or impress people who are always passing through - people who take the 
effects of those sites elsewhere when they leave (as they usually do). spreading 
them across the nation. So the Australian ghost story is built around a local site, 
but dramatically extends the influence or reach of that site. It produces a site­
based impression which spirals out of itself to effect, or affect, one's sense of the 
nation's well-being. Indeed, one's sense of the nation's well-being may well be 
disturbed by the impression one has of a local, haunted site, and if a supposedly 
·marginal" thing can account for far more than its marginality would suggest. 
A haunted site and a sacred site may, then, share certain features - and of 
course, the latter can also be associated with death, or with burial, and with the 
various powers which death (or the disturbance of the dead) has unleashed. A 
haunted site may appear empty or uninhabited; but in fact, it is always more than 
what it appears to be . To settle on a haunted site is to risk un-settlement, a 
postcolonial condition which acknowledges (rather than suppresses) the fact of 
previous, albeit displaced, inhabitation. The postcolonial ghost story is thus often 
quite literally about "the return of the repressed" - namely, the return of the 
"truth" (or a "truth effect") about colonisation. To dwell on a haunted site may 
produce a particular kind of postcolonial "worrying"; it is always better to pass 
through and, as we have suggested, the haunted site, like the sacred site, can 
spread its influence rather than restrict it simply to its precise location. We can 
think of Uluru as an example; the number of visitors who are drawn to it, pass 
through it and carry its effects away with them would suggest that tourism is not 
entirely inconsistent with sacredness in its modern form. 
In ghost stories the haunted site is known primarily through its effects, which, 
because they are not always restricted to a locality, may touch Aborigines and non­
Aborigines alike. This is not to say that these sites do not have a cause, a reason 
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why they are haunted. After all, the ghost story often depends upon an 
explanation of original causes. But the postcolonial ghost story tends to give more 
emphasis to effects rather than causes, to the impressions received by others from 
a haunted site which does not quite belong to them. Ghost stories are traditionally 
about possession; one takes possession of a haunted house and is possessed in 
return; all this happens on a property which is usually imagined as malevolent and 
overwhelming. But the postcolonial ghost story speaks more d irectly about 
(dis)possession through its emphasis on visiting or on passing through. The point 
about the postcolonial ghost story is that possession is there to be negotiated -
- whereas in the traditional ghost story there is no negotiation. Its haunted site is 
in this sense more "open" and liable to be spread, so that there is less of a 
distinction between the site itself and what is beyond the site. This is what we 
mean by the postcolonial ghost story: it is an "elementary" or "rudimentary" form 
of expression which is enacted in the midst of modernity, and which is capable of 
producing "gross" or luxurious effects that are unsettling in the sense that they 
overflow their location to speak uncannily to the nation's modern conditions. 
Australia has a ghost of its own, of course: the bunyip. There have been a 
number of stories, usually by non-Aboriginal writers, which have located the bunyip 
in swamps or waterholes and represented the creature as frightening, often 
foreboding death - as in Rosa Campbell Praed's "The Bunyip" ( 1 89 1  ). Praed's 
evocative story, which may be more exactly designated as "late colonial", gives 
us a creature who is heard rather than seen: this particular ghost only signifies 
itself aurally, as a sound. The sound works both to spread this haunted site and 
to confuse its origins: "Though we tried to move in the d irection of the voice, it 
was impossible to determine whence it came, so misleading and fitful and will-o'­
wisp-like was the sound" (Gelder 1 994: 1 08). So the haunted site in this story is 
all over the place. Just as it is without origins, so the bunyip also seems to have 
no cause; Praed is simply concerned with the effect this creature has on those 
settlers who pass through the bush. As Praed so beautifully puts it in her story -
in a way that recalls Kristeva's "smiles" and "worries" - the bunyip "deals out 
promiscuously benefits and calamities from the same hand" (ibid . :  1 03) .  Let us 
just pause over this adverb "promiscuously" for a moment. It offers the possibility, 
already suggested by the term solicit, that the haunted site - like the sacred sit 
- is at least potentially an overflowing, luxurious thing which can reach across 
place indiscriminately. Praed's bunyip gives expression to these features, for it 
suggests that one cannot refuse it; the thing takes effect and draws you in, for 
better or worse, whether you like it or not. 
The settlers in Praed's story have yet to become "homely", because they have 
been following a "dray, loaded with stores and furniture for the new home to 
which we were bound" (ibid . :  1 05).  In other words, these settlers are still 
unsettled, and their talk about "eerier things" speaks directly to that condition. In 
a certain sense they contribute to their haunting and their own unsettlement, since 
the bunyip is animated when they talk it up ("as we talked a sort of chill seemed 
to creep over us", [ibid . :  1 06] ) .  The creature "promiscuously" emanates its aura 
through the bush, touching the settlers, pre-occupying them, and forestalling their 
homely impulses. Far from being "subjectively immersed" in the landscape, they 
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are at least for the moment out of place or displaced. The bunyip becomes a figure 
for displacement, in effect, and in this sense it has a modern function. 
We can contrast this with a later, more explicitly postcolonial ghost story told 
by an Aboriginal man to the well-known Australian anthologist and poet, Roland 
Robinson. In the first part of Percy Mumbulla's narrative, also titled "The Bunyip" 
( 1 958), this creature - which in Praed's story had been simultaneously 
"promiscuous" and evasive - is now monogamous and attached. The bunyip here 
belongs to a "clever old-man", an Aboriginal elder. It is known or familiar, rather 
than unknown, and it is empowering rather than unsettling. Mumbulla's narrative 
suggests that the Aboriginal clever-man derives his power d irectly from this bunyip: 
This old fellow had a bunyip. It was his power, his moodjingarl. This bunyip 
was high in the front and low at the back like a hyena. like a lion. It had a 
terrible big bull·head and it was milk-white. This bunyip could go down into the 
ground and take the old man with him. They could travel under the ground. 
They could come out anywhere. They could come out of that old tree over 
there (ibid.: 250). 
Here, the Aboriginal clever-man and the bunyip travel together with 
outcomes which are already difficult to predict. It is not an issue of origins here, 
so much as a question of destination: there is no telling where the bunyip will end 
up. The description of this bunyip is worth noting, and aspects of it are repeated 
later on:  "That's when I saw the bunyip. He was milk white. He had a terrible 
big bull-head, a queer-looking thing" (ibid . :  251 1 .  The creature here is both exotic 
("like a hyena, like a lion", "queer-looking") and local; it seems to be both imported 
and indigenous. It is obviously associated with cattle, which would have 
frequented waterholes where bunyips are found, with attention drawn to its "milk­
white" features. So in a certain sense, this bunyip produced by colonisation and 
embodies some of its features - the whiteness, the cattle-like anatomy, and so 
on. 
Later, the Aboriginal clever-man argues with his sister, who was "as clever 
as he was". They magically cause each other's deaths through the resulting 
power-struggle - at which point the bunyip detaches himself and continues on his 
travels. So in the first part of the story, the bunyip was in a settled relationship 
to its Aboriginal host, albeit in the framework of an unsettled geography (mobility, 
unpredictable outcomes, etc . ) .  It leaves only when that settled relationship breaks 
down through the mutually-inflicted deaths of the brother and sister, deaths which 
the bunyip seems helpless to prevent. In the second part of the story, the bunyip 
is set free and in the process takes on a much more active function. At one point, 
he arrives unannounced at the home of an Aboriginal family: 
My old dad was smoking his pipe by the chimney. Mum heard the bunyip 
coming, roaring. The ground started to shake. He was coming closer. He 
came out of the ground underneath the tank-stand. Went over to the 
chimney and started rubbing himself against it. He started to get savage. 
He started to roar. Mum told Dad to go out and talk to him in the language, 
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tell him to go away, that we were all right. 
Dad went out and spoke to him in the language. He talked to him: "We are 
all right. No one doing any harm. You can go away" . . .  Every time Dad 
spoke to him, he'd roar. My old·man was talking: "Everything is all right. 
Don't get savage here" (ibid.: 250). 
The narrative shows how this second Aboriginal man is now obliged to 
negotiate with this creature, to calm him down. The bunyip needs to be told that 
no one is "doing any harm" to this family. and that as a consequence his powers 
are not required. This Aboriginal family, in other words, does not want to play 
host to this bunyip: it now functions as an unwanted guest, whose concern for the 
welfare of the family (much like modern, paternalistic bureaucracies) is drastically 
misplaced. We might even say, out of place, since this bunyip has an "unhomely" 
effect on what is clearly now a "homely" (i.e. domesticated) scene. This is 
rendered in the story by having the bunyip appear to become "primitive" - a 
feature which in this context unsettles this Aboriginal couple, and they send it 
away. At the same time, as we have noted, the descriptions of this bunyip clearly 
draw attention to the creature's modern characteristics: far from being "primitive", 
it is quite literally an introduced or imported species. 
A number of contradictions are thus mobilised in this story. The bunyip is 
a •milk white" thing that is metaphorically connected to cattle, those very things 
that signify the dispossession of Aborigines as cattle-based properties expanded 
across the country. And yet a creature which is so animated by colonisation is 
nevertheless, initially at least, shown to contribute to Aboriginal empowerment. 
Later on, however, the creature becomes wilder. more "savage", producing not 
empowerment so much as unsettlement. This savagery unsettles not the white 
settlers as the bunyip had in Praed's story, but Aboriginal people: the narrator's 
homely mother and father. In fact, as we have suggested this bunyip now quite 
literally has an unhometv character - turning up unannounced at their homestead, 
roaring wildly, suggestively rubbing himself up against the chimney, and so on. 
The creature itself is highly unsettled, highly mobile, marauding, his whereabouts 
now even more difficult to predict than before: "He travels around, up and down 
the coast . . .  He's even been seen in Victoria, at Lake Tyers Mission" (ibid . :  251 ) .  
So the second part o f  this strange story unleashes the bunyip t o  produce unsettling 
effects not on whites this time, but on Aborigines. And this seems to be because 
it now signifies two contradictory things: the "primitive", from which this modern, 
homely Aboriginal couple has dissociated itself; and the postcolonial, which -
precisely because it is itself a modern thing - shakes up (i.e. solicits: the sexuality 
implicit in this word is evident in the bunyip rubbing himself up against the 
chimney) the Aboriginal couple's home under the pretext of concern and demands 
their attention. And, of course, there is no essential contradiction here: the 
modern can indeed seem ·savage" enough, although this no doubt depends on 
who is looking at it. This couple are thus caught in the middle of this contradictory 
movement between the "primitive" and the postcolonial. It unsettles them, 
certainly; but we should pay attention to the way in which this Aboriginal couple 
engage with the bunyip as a matter of course. If nothing else, the later part of this 
strange story shows these Aboriginal characters keeping their pl;3ce - and their 
1 19 
sense of place - through direct negotiation [ . . .  ] .  
We have wanted to highlight the genre o f  the Australian ghost story because 
of its potential in relation to this country's postcolonial condition. We can think 
of this genre in terms of an entangled kind of haunting, which gives expression to 
unsettlement (or, displacement) in both Aboriginal and white Australians alike. 
This may well be because of the paradoxical arrangement of difference and 
sameness here - which that word "alike" may too easily smooth over. "Ghosts" 
cannot function in a climate of sameness, in a country which fantasises about itself 
as "one nation" or which imagines a utopian future of "reconciliation" in which all 
the bad memories have been laid to rest. But neither can they function in a climate 
of difference, where the one can never resemble the other - as in a "divided" 
nation. A more "promiscuous" structure in which sameness and d ifference impact 
upon each other, spilling over each other's boundaries only to return again to their 
respective places, moving back and forth in an unpredictable, even unruly 
manner - a structure in which sameness and difference embrace and refuse each 
other simultaneously: this is where the "ghosts" which may cause us to "smile" 
or to "worry" can flourish. 
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